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Introduction: The Pieces of Housing Integration
Moving Toward Integration1 is an exceedingly thorough work that
is indispensable to searching conversations about how to achieve racial
integration in housing in the twenty-first century. The book makes a
substantial contribution to the literature concerning housing policies,
†

Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, American Bar
Foundation Visiting Scholar, J.D. Harvard Law School, Ph.D. Duke
University. I would like to thank Case Western Reserve University School
of Law for inviting me to participate in the symposium on the book
Moving Toward Integration.

1.

Richard H. Sander et al., Moving Toward Integration: The
Past and Future of Fair Housing (2018).
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racial relations, the history of black and white segregation in the United
States, and the potential for racial integration in residential housing. It
adopts an impressive interdisciplinary approach to the subject matter
and has several main purposes and goals. First, it affirms the value of
racial integration and how impactful it is on individual lives. Second, it
seeks to identify and understand patterns of migration of racial
populations within the United States. The primary emphasis is on
African Americans and whites. Third, it draws upon historical and
current data from a variety of resources and time periods to examine
contributing factors to segregation, resegregation, and integration.
Fourth, the work offers a productive analysis of policies, programs, and
laws adopted in the past concerning housing, lending, segregation, and
integration, with a view towards extracting lessons. Fifth, the book
offers well-considered solutions and strategies.
The solutions such as mobility grants and community banks are
intriguing, thoughtful, and worth exploring. I examine those strategies
herein. I argue that it is necessary to be mindful that, with new
initiatives, the old issues of implementation, lack of political will, and
graft may arise. There are numerous places where I agree with the
book’s analysis and recommendations; there are also important places
where we differ. My comments fall under several headings: definition of
structural discrimination and structural segregation; troubling issues
with respect to courts, developers, and banks; reflections on disparate
impact theory; and the public’s will to integrate.

I. Structure and Approach
The book’s authors, Richard Sander, Yana Kucheva, and Jonathan
Zasloff, adopt a constructive strategy in tackling integration as a puzzle.
That approach is efficacious because it allows for a more comprehensive
explanation of the dynamics leading to the status quo, which is the
unintegrated state of many communities across the United States. The
authors recognize that identifying the root causes of segregation and
resegregation, as well as effective incentives for integration, are germane
components of the analysis. Another aspect of their strategy is
referencing key court decisions, such as Buchanan v. Warley,2 Shelley
v. Kramer,3 the Mount Laurel cases,4 Jones v. Mayer,5 and essential

2.

245 U.S. 60 (1917).

3.

334 U.S. 1 (1948).

4.

Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 290
A.2d 465 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972); Davis Enters. v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).

5.

392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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legislation such as the Fair Housing Act,6 as watershed organizing
moments. The book examines how each has impacted the terrain.

II. Structural Discrimination and Structural
Segregation
My definitions of structural discrimination and structural
segregation differ from that of Moving Toward Integration’s authors.
Relying upon their definition, the authors conclude that “structural
segregation (like housing discrimination) is relatively low.”7 Their
definition of “structural segregation” concerns “that portion of racial
segregation that results from racial differences in income, wealth, family
size, and other sociodemographic characteristics.”8 Although my
definition is sufficiently capacious to encapsulate the foregoing
elements, my emphasis is on structures and institutions and their
respective policies and practices. I am not asserting that there is no
value in measuring the racial segregation
associated with the
characteristics the authors highlight. Rather, I argue that government
at all levels—federal, state, and local— and lending institutions were
prominent actors in the history of racially segregating communities.
Appreciating the complex operations and effects of those structures is
indispensable to rendering an accurate account of contemporary racial
housing patterns and devising solutions for change. Systemic
discrimination, persistently, has functioned to maintain racially
Moreover, systemic
segregated
cities
and
neighborhoods.9
discrimination has produced and sustained substantial racial inequality
in many areas including income, wealth, employment, and education.
These socio-demographic variables profoundly influence housing
selection decisions.
As a strategy to highlight the role of structures in accordance with
how I conceptualize them, I analyze Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,10 Bank of
America Corp. v. City of Miami,11 and the Department of Justice’s 2012

6.

42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).

7.

Sander et al., supra note 1, at 439.

8.

Id. at 424.

9.

Angela Hanks et al., Systematic Inequality: How America’s Structural
Racism Helped Create the Black–White Wealth Gap, Ctr. for Am.
Progress (Feb. 21, 2018, 9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/race/reports/2018/02/21/447051/systematic-inequality/ [https://
perma.cc/JNW8-WFW7].

10.

135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).

11.

137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
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settlement with Wells Fargo.12 These examples illustrate how
government, powerful players, such as developers and banks, work to
perpetuate socio-economic racial exclusion that continues to harm
African-American communities.

III. Troubling Issues with Respect to Local
Government, Developers, and Courts
The following discussion is a prelude to my analysis of Moving
Toward Integration’s proposal that mobility grants should be utilized
as one strategy to foster integration.13 While I see tremendous positives
in proposing such grants as one solution, I am also cautious because of
how incentives have been subverted in the past.14
A. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities (2015)

Inclusive Communities exemplifies how a potentially robust tool
such as disparate-impact liability can be stripped of its power and
effectively neutralized so that the Fair Housing Act is prevented from
performing the integrative work it was intended to do. Inclusive
Communities demonstrates that government, encompassing its various
instrumentalities (legislative, administrative, municipal, state, and
federal), and courts, can frustrate integration goals. The FHA was the
12.

Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo Resulting in
More Than $175 Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair
Lending Claims, Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-reaches-settlement-wells-fargo-resulting-more-175-million-relief
[https://perma.cc/56VV-T98U] (last updated Oct. 8, 2014).

13.

Sander et al., supra note 1, at 423–29.

14.

Although presented by local government as a win–win vehicle to revitalize
areas desperately in need of development and economic stimulus, in some
areas the financial gains of Tax Increment Financing (TIFs) have been
appropriated for other purposes, ultimately harming communities they
were purportedly intended to benefit. See Anthony Flint, The Hidden
Costs of TIF, Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, https://www.lincolninst.edu/
publications/articles/hidden-costs-tif [https://perma.cc/P8RC-6C7B] (last
visited June 1, 2020); David Merriman, Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y,
Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic
Development (2018), available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/
policy-focus-reports/improving-tax-increment-financing-tif-economicdevelopment [https://perma.cc/3REV-X9SC].
Both Flint’s article and Merriman’s report discuss TIF issues that impact
residential racial integration and the financial well-being of communities.
Moving Toward Integration’s authors also address some of TIFs shortfalls.
The lesson I take from TIFs and other incentive programs is that
transparency and thoughtful oversight by those committed to the stated
objective (e.g., racial integration) are essential.
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primary vehicle through which the Inclusive Communities plaintiffs
formulated their complaint. Moving Toward Integration also gives
attention to Inclusive Communities and expresses optimism regarding
the court’s ruling on disparate-impact theory.15 The book’s authors
appropriately focus on the Fair Housing Act as being fundamental to
the work of integration.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (“ICP” or “Inclusive
Communities”) initiated its case against Texas Department of Housing
and Community Affairs (“TDHCA” or “Texas Department of
Housing”) when it brought suit alleging that TDHCA violated the FHA
by distributing low-income-housing tax credits in a manner that
perpetuated housing segregation patterns.16 As a non-profit
organization working primarily with African Americans to assist them
with identifying affordable rental housing that would accept Section 8
vouchers,17 Inclusive Communities was frustrated by the paucity of
housing choices available to its clients. According to ICP, too often the
limited options were situated in over-concentrated urban areas in
Dallas, Texas.18 These neighborhoods typically lacked decent school
choices and did not have adequate municipal services, such as road
maintenance, waste management, fire and police protection, parks, and
other safe public spaces.
Administration of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”)
was the central focus of the case.19 Moving Toward Integration examines
LIHTC in detail, drawing important lessons regarding how to structure
incentives for encouraging racially-integrated affordable housing
options.20 The LIHTC program is federally authorized. It operates to
monetarily incentivize developers to build affordable housing. Initiated
by the federal government in 1986, it is the “largest single source of
funding for the development of low-income rental housing.”21 The
15.

Sander et al., supra note 1, at 442–44.

16.

Tx. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2514 (2015).

17.

Section 8 vouchers are part of a federally authorized housing-subsidy
program. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Housing,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_sectio
n_8 [https://perma.cc/SQY3-G9QX] (last visited June 1, 2020).

18.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514.

19.

Id. at 2513.

20.

Sander et al., supra note 1, at 319–21, 329.

21.

Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power
to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1191, 1213 n.106
(2011); see also Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, HUD: Off. of Pol’y
Dev. & Res., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html
[https://perma.cc/SQJ9-E7YG] (last updated May 24, 2019) (The program
provides “nearly $8 billion in annual budget authority to issue tax credits
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Internal Revenue Service awards tax credits to states; LIHTC then
permits states or other designated government entities to distribute tax
credits to developers. States are required to first develop a plan, listing
criteria that they must reference to make decisions about how to
allocate tax credits to developers.22 The allocation of credits impacts
where low-income housing is sited. Private developers, in turn, can sell
the credits to financial institutions and other investors in order to raise
capital to cover the costs of constructing low-income housing, as
prescribed by federal statute.23 The statute defines a “qualified lowincome housing project” as “any project for residential rental property”
that satisfies the statutory criteria pertaining to the number of units
that are “rent-restricted” and occupied by a certain percentage of
individuals whose incomes fall within the acceptable parameters of the
“area median gross income.”24 The program has come under fire in
recent years because, while it has resulted in substantial profits for
developers and banks, it has not sufficiently produced low-income
housing in geographically and economically diverse areas,25 nor have
blacks and Latinos been able to equally access LIHTC housing produced
in low-poverty areas.26 The Texas Department of Housing administers
its plan according to points it awards based upon criteria the
development project satisfies.27
for the acquisition, rehabilitation, or new construction of rental housing
targeted to lower-income households”).
22.

This is the Qualified Allocation Plan requirement. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m) (2012).

23.

Id. § 42(g)(1);

24.

26 U.S.C. §42(g)(1).

25.

Patrice Taddonio, In America’s Affordable Housing Crisis, More Demand
but Less Supply, Frontline (May 9, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/article/in-americas-affordable-housing-crisis-more-demand-butless-supply/ [https://perma.cc/UC6D-NUL6]. See Poverty, Profit, and
Politics, (PBS: Frontline television broadcast May 9, 2017), available at
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/poverty-politics-and-profit/
[https://perma.cc/XJY3-YJ8].

26.

Often when affordable housing is constructed, the federal Section 8
voucher system, along with the imposition of additional requirements,
inhibits or altogether precludes racial minorities, such as African
Americans, from taking full advantage of the housing. While it is true
that LIHTC has been successful in increasing the supply of affordable
units, with respect to the FHA’s goal of achieving racially- integrated
housing and neighborhoods, LIHTC has not made an impactful difference.
See id. See also, Will Fischer, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT COULD DO MORE TO
EXPAND OPPORTUNITY FOR POOR FAMILIES, 1- 14 (2018), 4.

27.

Tex. Gov’t Code § 2306.6710(b) (West 2019); see also Reply Brief for
Petitioners at 4–5, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371).
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In the underlying case, Inclusive Communities argued that the
Texas Department of Housing’s practices resulted in more low-income
housing being built in urban areas heavily populated by blacks in
comparison to geographic areas primarily populated by whites.28
Inclusive Communities maintained that the relatively limited number
of tax credit-sponsored affordable housing projects constructed in the
suburbs signaled a violation of the FHA:
TDHCA’s selection and allocation of LIHTC units in the City of
Dallas was the functional equivalent of intentional racial
segregation. Whether there was deliberate racial bias or not,
TDHCA achieved the same segregated result as if there had been
an explicit decision to engage in racial segregation. TDHCA has
not just perpetuated but exacerbated the exact discriminatory
effects of racial segregation that Congress passed the FHA to
remedy.29

According to statistical evidence, “state wide TDHCA approved
49.7% of family units in 90% or greater minority census tracts.”30 In
contrast, “TDHCA approved 37.4% of all family units in 90% or greater
[w]hite tracts.”31 Inclusive Communities further noted that, “even when
units were approved in [w]hite areas, it was for locations where the
likely tenants were also more likely to be [w]hite.”32 Additionally, the
data submitted to the district court revealed that, “92.29% of LIHTC
units in the city of Dallas were located in census tracts with less than
50% Caucasian residents.”33 Inclusive Communities maintained that,
not only did African Americans suffer disparate harm as a result of
TDHCA’s actions, but that the company itself was also negatively
impacted in its ability to effectively perform its housing-placement and
neighborhood-racial-integration missions.34
28.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514.

29.

Brief for Respondent at 17–18, Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015)
(No. 13-1371) (citation omitted).

30.

Id. at 24.

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514 (quoting Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 499 (N.D.
Tex. 2010); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 24.

34.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514. At the district court, the specific
harm Inclusive Communities alleged it suffered concerned difficulties it
experienced in placing Section 8 voucher tenants:
To establish causation, [Inclusive Communities] presents evidence that
TDHCA disproportionately denies tax credits to proposed developments
in Caucasian neighborhoods, making it more difficult for [Inclusive
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The plaintiff framed its case in terms of the FHA, alleging that
TDHCA’s practices violated sections 804(a)35 and 805(a)36 and
interfered overall with the Act’s integrative objectives.37 Relying upon
a disparate-impact theory,38 Inclusive Communities argued that even
though there may not be direct evidence showing that TDHCA made
solely race-conscious decisions in distributing housing credits, its
practices in administering the program worked to racially divide
communities and concentrate low-income housing in small geographic
areas rather than evenly disperse units throughout Dallas and its
suburbs.39
The Supreme Court decided the question of whether disparate
impact claims may be brought under the Fair Housing Act.40 In a 5–4
decision, the Court held that disparate-impact liability is within the
FHA’s scope;41 not only are such claims cognizable, but they are

Communities] to find Section 8-participating housing in those areas.
Because TDHCA is the sole entity with authority to award tax credits to
developers, its decisions directly affect the availability and geographical
distribution of low-income housing.
Inclusive Cmtys., 749 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (footnote omitted). Persuaded
by this evidence, the district court held that Inclusive Communities had
established causation. Id. at 497.
35.

See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012) (making it unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale
or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”)
(emphasis added).

36.

See id. § 3605(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity
whose business includes engaging in real estate-related transactions to
discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction,
or in terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”) (emphasis added).

37.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514. It should be noted that at the
district-court level, Inclusive Communities also alleged that TDHCA
engaged in intentional discrimination that violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1984 (2012). Inclusive Cmtys.,
749 F. Supp. 2d at 491.

38.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2513.

39.

Id. at 2514.

40.

Id. at 2513.

41.

Specifically, the Court held that “disparate-impact claims are cognizable
under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-oriented language,
the Court’s interpretation of similar language in Title VII and the ADEA,
Congress’ ratification of disparate-impact claims in 1988 against the
backdrop of the unanimous view of nine Courts of Appeals, and the
statutory purpose.” Id. at 2525. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer. Id.
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“consistent with the FHA’s central purpose”42 of eliminating
discrimination in real-estate and housing transactions. The Court did
not reach a decision with respect to the underlying dispute concerning
whether TDHCA’s distribution of housing tax credits to developers
either resulted in a disparate impact on African-American residents or
violated the Fair Housing Act.43 Instead, the Court focused on outlining
the proper approach for reviewing an FHA disparate-impact case and
remanded the matter so that the lower court could apply the
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) burdenshifting framework to this FHA disparate-impact claim.44
Although civil-rights advocates cautiously hailed Inclusive
Communities as a cause for celebration because of the potential for
disparate-impact claims to remedy racially harmful patterns and
practices, the Court’s holding is still concerning: it constrained how
disparate-impact theory can be used in FHA complaints while
expanding what counts as a defense to such claims. It is also worth
noting that, given that nine courts of appeals had previously concluded
that intent was not a requirement to establish an FHA claim, the
decision is not as surprising as it initially appears, notwithstanding the
Court’s ideologically conservative composition.45
Moving Toward Integration’s authors express optimism that
disparate-impact theory may be a useful mechanism for accomplishing
integration in the future.46 While I share their appreciation of disparateimpact theory’s potential, I note the problematic double-sided nature
of the Inclusive Communities decision. The case presents itself as a
supportive precedent for antidiscrimination litigants, but in fact
operates to further narrow the power of disparate-impact liability as a
means of achieving racial integration under the FHA. After Inclusive
Communities, it is clear that although plaintiffs can bring FHA
disparate-impact claims, such claims are extremely likely to fail. To
understand why, it is necessary to examine the Court’s instructions for
how FHA disparate impact-claims should be evaluated.

at 2512. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia
dissented. Id.
42.

Id. at 2521.

43.

See id. at 2513.

44.

Id. at 2525–26; see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013).

45.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2519, 2525 (“In light of the longstanding
judicial interpretation of the FHA to encompass disparate-impact claims
and congressional reaffirmation of that result, residents and policymakers
have come to rely on the availability of disparate-impact claims.”).

46.

See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 233–50, 423–44.
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1. Referencing ADEA and Title VII as Precedents to Determine the
Viability of the Disparate Impact Claim and Its Parameters
a. Relevance of the ADEA and Title VII to Both the Court’s Inclusive
Communities Decision and Disparate-Impact Analysis

Two anti-employment-discrimination statutes figured prominently
in the Court’s reasoning in Inclusive Communities, and both are
germane to the elaboration of my critique. The first statute was section
703(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.47 The second was
Section 4(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.48
While these statutes were relevant to the Court’s quest to find
precedent for its ultimate holding—that disparate-impact claims may
be brought under the FHA49—the Court went too far in its
interpretation of their relevance for purposes of identifying restraints
on the application of disparate-impact theory.
The Court referenced the ADEA in connection with examining its
plurality decision in Smith v. City of Jackson.50 In Smith, the Court
interpreted the “otherwise adversely affect” language of Section 4(a)(2)
of the ADEA51 to mean that, regardless of an employer’s expressed or
unexpressed intentions or motivations, it may be liable where its actions
and policies (with respect to age) have a disproportionate negative
effect on employees (or potential employees). The Inclusive
Communities Court compared the “otherwise adversely affect”
language of Title VII and the ADEA, and determined that the phrase
was “equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA’s ‘otherwise make
unavailable’ language.”52
Referencing Griggs v. Duke Power,53 the Court identified other
supportive statutory language and concluded that intent was not a

47.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2516.

48.

Id. at 2517.

49.

Id. at 2518 (“Together, Griggs holds and the plurality in Smith instructs
that antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparateimpact claims when their text refers to the consequences of action and
not just to the mindset of actors, and where that interpretation is
consistent with statutory purpose.”).

50.

544 U.S. 228 (2005).

51.

See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of such
individual’s age.”).

52.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2519.

53.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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requisite element of liability under the FHA.54 Based upon the
similarities in language and objectives, and the interpretation of Title
VII in Griggs,55 the Court reasoned that, just as disparate-impact claims
are allowed under the ADEA and Title VII, they are contemplated by
the FHA.56 The FHA, like those other statutes, “was enacted to
eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation’s
economy.”57
The Court’s reliance upon the ADEA and Title VII yielded a
positive result with respect to recognizing the legal viability of FHA
disparate-impact cases. The damaging aspect of the Court’s analysis
emerges with the restrictive frame it imposes on this type of claim.
b. The Inappropriateness of Employment-Discrimination Law
as a Model for Fair Housing Claims

Having established the precedential value of the Court’s readings
of the ADEA and Title VII to its interpretation of the FHA, the Court
then further considered Smith v. City of Jackson and the Title VII
disparate-impact cases of Griggs and Ricci v. DeStefano58 to identify
limitations that courts should impose when evaluating cases relying
upon disparate-impact theory.59 It is in this part of its reasoning that
the Court took steps to substantially weaken the power of disparateimpact claims. The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development’s new
guidelines60 to interpret the FHA furnished additional grounds to
essentially disarm disparate-impact cases. Take, for instance, the
business-necessity defense.61 The defense grants employers substantial
latitude to justify their actions, even when those actions have
discriminatory effects. In entertaining the defense, courts are deferential
to employers because they see employers as being better positioned to
make decisions about what is necessary for their profitability and the
smooth functioning of their businesses. The Court concluded that the
same rationale for the business-necessity defense in employmentdiscrimination cases also offers reasonable parameters for limiting
54.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518.

55.

Id. at 2518–19.

56.

Id. at 2518.

57.

Id. at 2521 (citations omitted).

58.

557 U.S. 557 (2009). Griggs and Ricci are employment-discrimination
decisions. Thus, their paradigmatic value for FHA disparate impact claims
is limited.

59.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2517–18, 2522–23.

60.

Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013).

61.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
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disparate-impact liability under the FHA.62 It reasoned that the
employment cases “teach that disparate-impact liability must be
limited so employers and other regulated entities are able to make the
practical business choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a
vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system.”63
The Court’s analysis is faulty in several respects. When the Court
referenced the business-necessity defense, it cast housing-entity
decision-makers and private developers as employers, even though the
analogy does not fit in the FHA context. The reasoning the Court offers
for resorting to this paradigm is seriously impoverished:
Just as an employer may maintain a workplace requirement that
causes a disparate impact if that requirement is a ‘reasonable
measure[ment] of job performance,’ so too must housing
authorities and private developers be allowed to maintain a policy
if they can prove it is necessary to achieve a valid interest.64

This conclusion is not logically sound. It does not follow that housing
authorities and developers should escape further scrutiny simply
because they can state a valid interest, particularly when their practices
cause a racially discriminatory harm.
The practices that Inclusive Communities challenged were not
those taken by employers with respect to employees; the decisions
concerned the development and placement of affordable housing. The
Texas Department of Housing’s role as employer was not being called
into question per se. That is, Inclusive Communities’ lawsuit recognized
that when the department makes decisions about LIHTC it is not
simply a hiring decision. Rather, the decisions pertain to locating
appropriate sites for low-income housing, the application of criteria for
project selection, and the selection of developers to partner with to
build the housing. Thus, the employer–employee paradigm is
inappropriate. Instead, the relevant inquiries are whether housing
agencies and public servants are performing their duties to the public,
and whether they are pursuing the integration goals of the FHA in
maintaining adherence to fair-housing laws.65 Similarly, to the extent
62.

Id. at 2518.

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 2523 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)).

65.

The FHA emerged out of the government’s recognition that an
“integrated society” was needed to respond to “the explosive
concentration of Negroes in urban ghettoes.” Brief for Constitutional
Accountability Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3–4,
Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (Nos. 151111, 15-1112) (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. S3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968)
(statement of Sen. Mondale), and 114 Cong. Rec. H9589 (daily ed. Apr.
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that private developers partner with public entities, courts’ analyses
should concentrate on whether developers demonstrated the requisite
public concern when proposing, advocating, and completing low-income
housing projects. The relevant questions include whether the projects
were sufficiently diversified along racial and geographic lines. Despite
the inappropriateness of the employer–employee lens for analyzing
discriminatory practices in housing, the Court drew upon the logic of
the former to impose a straitjacket on FHA disparate-impact-liability
plaintiffs.
Texas’s LIHTC program was under scrutiny in Inclusive
Communities.66 That program’s primary objective is to increase lowincome housing. The state and local administrators of the program must
accomplish that objective in conformity with the FHA. It is not an
either–or endeavor. That is, unlike situations involving businesses,
profit is not the driving motivation. While profit is usually the sine qua
non of companies, this is not necessarily the case when they are enlisted
to fulfill public goals, as they are with LIHTC programs; in those
situations, they are subject to other requirements. Thus, it is improper
for courts to adopt a hands-off policy when they scrutinize how
government entities perform their duties in connection with furthering
the FHA’s objectives. Where racial discrimination is alleged, the
agency’s selection of low-income housing sites and developers, the
weighing of the criteria for the administration of the LIHTC, and the
diversity of development proposals should all be subject to strict
scrutiny.
The Court, contrary to the FHA’s mandate to diminish housing
discrimination through integration efforts, elevated the business
justifications it predicted government entities and developers would
likely offer to defend their site and project selections for low-income
housing. From the Court’s lens, “market factors,” such as “cost and
traffic patterns . . . preserving historic architecture,”67 and “compliance
with health and safety codes”68 are all potentially acceptable reasons
10, 1968) (statement of Rep. Ryan)); see also Nat’l Advisory Comm’n
on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders 8 (1968).
66.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2513. There are other government
affordable-housing programs. See Daria Daniel, Affordable Housing
Federal Programs and Legislation, Nat’l Ass’n of Counties (May 14,
2018), https://www.naco.org/articles/affordable-housing-federal-programsand-legislation [https://perma.cc/8TRT-TFZP] (listing other such programs).

67.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.

68.

Id. at 2524. The Court concluded that if “housing authorities and private
developers” can “prove” that their practices are “necessary to achieve a
valid interest,” they “must” be permitted to keep such practices in place.
Id. at 2523.
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that would insulate these housing-market actors from FHA disparateimpact liability. In articulating the list of exculpatory factors, the Court
expressed its concern over “a community’s quality of life,”69 but it did
not demonstrate the same concern towards the communities who are
subjected to more than their “fair share” of low-income housing.70
Moreover, the Court’s logic loses sight of the FHA’s anti-discriminatory
purposes. The involvement of other intervening actors and events in
the decision-making process should not disqualify the governmental
housing agency (in this instance, the TDHCA) from being recognized
as the entity that caused the discriminatory harm.
2.

The Burden Shifting Framework

HUD imposed a new analytical construct for the evaluation of FHA
disparate-impact claims.71 The burden-shifting framework, in the
housing context, lacks historical foundation. Stacey Seicshnaydre has
observed that “none of the judicially created, burden shifting methods
of proof generated over the history of Title VII and Title VIII can be
found in the text of the FHA.”72 The cumbersome framework
significantly enhances the burden on disparate impact plaintiffs:
(1) The plaintiff “has the burden of proving that a challenged
practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory
effect”;73
(2) Once a plaintiff makes a prima-facie showing of disparate
impact, “the burden shifts to the defendant to ‘prov[e] that the

69.

Id.

70.

Here, I am borrowing the term “fair share” from the Mount Laurel cases
which imposed the requirement on New Jersey communities to accept
their fair share of affordable housing. See South Burlington Cty. NAACP
v. Mount Laurel Township, 336 A.2d 713, 743–44 (N.J. 1975); South
Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 456 A.2d 390, 411
(N.J. 1983); Hills Dev. Co. v. Somerset, 510 A.2d 621, 631 (N.J. 1986).
Sander, Kucheva, and Zasloff also engage in a productive examination of
the Mount Laurel cases. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 239–43.

71.

Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013).

72.

Stacey E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An
Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Claims Under the Fair
Housing Act, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 357, 410 (2013).

73.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1)
(2014)).
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challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests’”;74 and
(3) If the defendant meets the requirements of step 2, then the
“plaintiff may ‘prevail upon proving that the substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged
practice could be served by another practice that has a less
discriminatory effect.’”75

Not only is HUD’s imposition of the foregoing scheme problematic
from the standpoint of vigilant enforcement of the FHA, but the Court’s
recommendations concerning the requisite kind of proof and its
suggestions for evaluating the proof reveal how the Inclusive
Communities holding, when taken in its entirety, is detrimental to FHA
plaintiffs. The Court offered the following supplementary instructions
in connection with remanding the case.76
a. Establishing a causal connection

Establishing a causal link between the defendants’ actions and the
harm claimed is the initial hurdle that plaintiffs must overcome.77 The
Court advised that “[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading
stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection
cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.”78 A fair
reading of the Court’s formulation is that it requires a plaintiff to
establish his claim before being granted a trial on the entirety of his
case. The Court’s approach forecloses opportunities to elicit evidence in
the context of a full hearing. Prior to having the benefit of an extensive
due-diligence investigation or being able to evaluate the defendant’s
evidence and subject it to the rigors of interrogation, the Court
essentially requires the plaintiff to prove its case—that is, the plaintiff
must establish that the reason for the alleged racial disparity is an
isolated government action (policy, practice, or law). Interestingly, as
discussed below, the plaintiff cannot successfully assert that the racial
disparity is due to the failure of the government to take action.79
74.

Id. at 2514–15 (alteration in original) (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2)
(2014)).

75.

Id. at 2515 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (2014)).

76.

Id. The district court improperly placed the burden on the defendant to
devise alternatives rather than on plaintiff. Id.

77.

24 C.F.R. §100.500(c)(1) (2014).

78.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.

79.

See id. (pointing out that a plaintiff fails to make a prima facie disparateimpact case if she does not allege facts at the pleading stage demonstrating
a causal connection between the governmental action and the disparate
impact).
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The Court outlines the contours of the causal requirement that a
disparate-impact plaintiff must satisfy without providing the substance
of what the requirement entails. Instead of constructing a fairly lenient
standard that would permit the plaintiff to present some facts
supporting a claim that the government’s practice has a racially
harmful impact in tension with the FHA, the Court engages in a lengthy
discussion that achieves little more than emphasizing the impossibility
of satisfying the causation requirement for cases of this type. In the
end, rather than articulate a precise standard, the Court leaves open
the question of what constitutes a sufficient nexus between government
action and harmful racial effects to establish a prima facie case. What
is clear is that courts must subject any prima facie evidence submitted
by plaintiffs to rigorous scrutiny; further, this evidence must do more
than establish a racial disparity.80 Even if a plaintiff is able to furnish
evidence connecting housing racial disparities to governmental actions,
such evidence will be heavily discounted. This is clear from the Court’s
statements which essentially inoculate agencies, like TDHCA, from
disparate impact liability where “federal law substantially inhibits [the
agencies’] discretion.”81 The Court offers federal involvement, via
regulations and rules, as an appropriate limit on liability without
considering the actual impact of that involvement on state and local
agencies, as they make LIHTC siting decisions. Federal requirements
have more latitude than the Court suggests. Disparate impact analysis,
properly applied, should allow for figuring out the effects resulting from
the application of relevant criteria, embedded in rules and laws, and
should allow for identifying legal solutions that have less discriminatory
effects.
The Inclusive Communities Court configured the causation
requirement in a manner that is unduly onerous on plaintiffs. The
approach affords decision-makers substantial deference while
undercutting the evidence plaintiffs are likely to offer. The framework
is counter to the very systemic operations that disparate-impact
liability is designed to apprehend. In other words, it overlooks the
structures that work to create discriminatory impacts. Other than
pointing to the authority (i.e., the exercise of discretion) of the
designated agency to make the final decisions regarding placement of
housing, it is impossible to isolate a singular practice that violated the
FHA. Instead, it is the culmination of practices—the selection of the
criteria, the priority given to some requirements over others, the
willingness to entertain community resistance (“NIMBY”-ism)—
cohering in the decision-making body that creates the problem. Rather
than appreciating that the governmental decision-making process is
80.

Id. at 2523.

81.

Id. at 2523–2524.
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interlinked with others, in that it prevails upon subordinate entities and
agents, the Court concludes that if the plaintiff cannot isolate a policy
or practice in connection with the statistical evidence, then his
disparate impact claim must fail.82
The Court’s perspective fails to appreciate that decision-making
authority is ultimately resolved in one entity to determine which
LIHTC projects will be funded and where they will be located. Here,
the ultimate decider for administering the LIHTC program, as
designated by state statute, is the Texas Department of Housing.83
Courts should not be permitted to disregard the department’s
statutorily conferred role and replace it with a characterization of the
Texas LIHTC program’s decision-making process that insulates the
designated decider from liability. Furthermore, the federal
government’s involvement in levying requirements on the state and
local administration of such programs does not negate the TDHCA’s
actions in rendering decisions regarding low-income housing
placement.84 As the Court itself observed, neither the FHA85 nor other
federally imposed criteria mandate that low-income housing always be
placed in overcrowded urban centers. The TDHCA has discretion
regarding the approval of sites; it could exercise its discretion to give a
greenlight to affordable housing in the suburbs and in other parts of
the municipality to which racially diverse low-income populations seek
access.
The Court fetishizes the notion of singularity, making the
identification of a sole action a requirement for establishing a prima
facie case.86 For example, the Court reasoned:
[A] plaintiff challenging the decision of a private developer to
construct a new building in one location rather than another will
not easily be able to show this is a policy causing disparate impact
because such a one-time decision may not be a policy at all. It may
also be difficult to establish causation because of the multiple

82.

Id. at 2523 (“[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical
disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant policy or
policies causing that disparity.”).

83.

10 Tex. Admin. Code § 11.1 (2019); see also Brief for Respondent, supra
note 29, at 37 (“TDHCA was the only agency in the state that could
allocate LIHTC.”).

84.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (“[I]f [Inclusive Communities] cannot
show a causal connection between the Department’s policy and a
disparate impact—for instance, because federal law substantially limits
the Department’s discretion that should result in dismissal of this case.”).

85.

Id. at 2523.

86.

Id. at 2514.
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factors that go into investment decisions about where to construct
or renovate housing units.87
The Court imposes the requirement of exact precision with respect
to identifying a singular cause and measuring its harm.88 Disparateimpact theory, however, distills patterns. Where there are disturbing
correlations between government action and race that result in a denial
of federal constitutional rights, (e.g., protection from racially
discriminatory treatment in procuring housing), disparate-impact
theory facilitates the flagging of occurrences and outcomes and compels
courts to inquire further into the sources responsible for engendering
the conditions that perpetuate inequality. While it is important, for
reasons of fairness and rigorous judicial inquiry, that the analysis does
not end with highlighting a racial disparity, it is imperative that the
Court does not construct the rubric for testing such claims in a manner
that ensures their defeat. Contrary to the Court’s view, the fact that
there are differing components that contribute to a decision should not
mandate the preclusion of plaintiff’s disparate-impact claim.89 When
statistical racial disparities are caused by a series of practices or policies
that cohere in an entity’s decisions, and that entity is imbued with
ultimate decision-making authority, disparate-impact liability should
be triggered (i.e., the prima facie threshold is met).
On remand,90 the District Court for the Northern District of Texas
adopted a substantially different posture towards Inclusive
Communities’ case from when it was first presented with the facts.91 It
opted to re-evaluate whether Inclusive Communities satisfied the first
prong of the burden-shifting framework—the causation requirement—
which proved to be the plaintiff’s undoing.92 Subjecting the plaintiff to
87.

Id. at 2523–24.

88.

Id.

89.

The Court warns that if “a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors
other than the defendant’s policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima
facie case, and there is no liability.” Id.

90.

The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit. See
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2526. A Fifth Circuit panel then remanded
the case to the district court. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 795 F.3d 509, 510 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

91.

Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016). In
a prior decision, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Inclusive Communities, ruling that “[it] had established a prima facie case
on its disparate impact claim.” Id. at *3.

92.

Inclusive Cmtys., No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *10 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 26, 2016) (“[Inclusive Communities] has not satisfied the robust
causality requirement.”).
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what the Supreme Court had characterized as a “robust causality
requirement,”93 the court found Inclusive Communities’ evidence of
disparate-impact discrimination lacking.94 In articulating the plaintiff’s
duty, the district court stated that Inclusive Communities “must
affirmatively identify a specific policy that produced a disparate impact
rather than point to a lack of policy that caused it.”95 Thus, the district
court inquired about “whether TDHCA’s exercise of discretion in
deciding how to allocate 9% tax credits is a specific, facially neutral
policy sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
liability.”96
Based on its analysis of the foregoing, the district court dismissed
the case,97 concluding that the decisions to place low-income housing in
certain neighborhoods and to choose sites in minority-populated areas
rather than predominantly Caucasian-populated areas (which were
signified by the awarding of tax credits) did not constitute a “specific
practice that caused the disparity in the location of low-income
housing.”98 Inclusive Communities could not show that Texas, in
making decisions about how tax credits were distributed, caused a
discriminatory impact that was detrimental to African Americans.99
b. Prongs Two and Three of the Burden-Shifting Framework

There are also significant problems with the Court’s interpretation
of prongs two and three of the burden-shifting framework. Assuming
that a plaintiff is able to survive the first level, in the second phase, the
government is permitted to proffer legitimate rationales to refute the
allegations of discrimination. The business-justification defenses
discussed in the previous section are relevant here. The Court went
further in offering recommendations for how to evaluate the proffered
reasons in relationship to the plaintiff’s claim of disparate impact
discrimination, commenting that, “on remand, [the plaintiff’s case] may
93.

Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.

94.

Inclusive Cmtys., No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *6.

95.

Id. In addition to drawing upon the Supreme Court’s decision, the court
looked to Fifth Circuit Judge Jones’s concurring opinion as a blueprint
for analyzing the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at *5.

96.

Id.

97.

Id. at *13.

98.

Id. at *6. Inclusive Communities argued that the governmental decisions
of site selection, zoning laws, and tenant selection harm low-income
minorities in that they “exclude” them “from predominantly nonminority
areas—cities, towns, neighborhoods or specific portions of apartment
complexes.” Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 36.

99.

Inclusive Cmtys., No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *6.
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be seen simply as an attempt to second-guess which of two reasonable
approaches a housing authority should follow in the sound exercise of
its discretion in allocating tax credits for low-income housing.”100
Missing from the Court’s reasoning is an anchor from which to evaluate
what is reasonable. The Court does not carve out space for the FHA’s
purpose or for the realization of the FHA’s goals. The impetus for
bringing a lawsuit of this type is to challenge the government’s conduct
in housing-development schemes and in its administration of housing
laws and policies. It is appropriate, therefore, for plaintiffs to question
those practices when they permit an intolerable racially disparate effect.
There is a grander constitutionally informed template according to
which courts should evaluate the government’s responses and plaintiff’s
claims, notwithstanding the Court’s assertion that “[t]he FHA does not
decree a particular vision of urban development.”101 Contrary to the
Supreme Court’s assertion that the “FHA is not an instrument to force
housing authorities to reorder their priorities,”102 the FHA is intended
to accomplish exactly that in the name of racial equality. The FHA
promotes and prioritizes desegregation and integration as fundamental
goals.103 It is inspired by the Kerner Commission’s recommendation
urging the country to change its troubling trajectory of “moving
towards two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”104
Congress adopted the FHA shortly following the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968,105 and on the heels of the
Kerner Commission’s damning report.106 The Court’s misapprehension
of the work that the FHA was intended to perform with respect to
eliminating racial disparities in housing is evident:
Difficult questions might arise if disparate-impact liability under
the FHA caused race to be used and considered in a pervasive
and explicit manner to justify governmental or private actions
that, in fact, tend to perpetuate race-based considerations rather
than move beyond them. Courts should avoid interpreting
disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject racial
considerations into every housing decision.107

100. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
101. Id. at 2523.
102. Id. at 2522.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). See Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 211 (1972).
104. Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Civil Disorders, supra note 65, at 1.
105. Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 2.
106. Exec. Order No. 11,365, 3 C.F.R. § 647 (1966–1970).
107. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
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Plaintiffs will assert that certain housing policies have led to racial
disparities. Their claims will necessitate that courts consider matters of
race in order to properly address those claims. But the Court’s language
here seeks to foreclose that process by expressing anxiety that it cannot
judicially perform this task, and that such claims in themselves are
improper. The claims already reference race. Therefore, courts will need
to take race into consideration to analyze the cases presented.
With respect to the third prong, the burden is unfairly placed on
plaintiffs to devise alternatives to the challenged practice. Decisions like
Inclusive Communities (and its resolution on remand) make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to draw upon anti-discrimination tools, such as
the FHA, to shape government policies and practices for the purpose of
attaining equality in housing, achieving racial integration, and
improving the access of low-income racial minorities to communities
that are socio-economically, racially, and geographically diverse.
Inclusive Communities is exemplary of the multi-faceted problems
emerging from missed opportunities related to the FHA.
B. Developers

Inclusive Communities also raises an issue with respect to
developers and the role they play in both facilitating racial integration
in housing and constructing affordable housing. Developers are
substantial contributors to the problem in terms of the proposals they
submit for the siting of residences. If they fail to present geographically
diverse projects, and they are not incentivized or mandated to do so by
government agencies, then the construction of affordable housing is
relegated to the usual sectors (i.e., overcrowded urban cores,
impoverished suburbs, isolated and economically-challenged ex-urbs).
In a true public–private partnership, it is appropriate to ask developers
to perform in certain ways or to satisfy particular objectives in
conjunction with being granted the privilege of constructing multifamily affordable housing. On this point, I am at odds with Moving
Toward Integration’s authors, who characterize the imposition of
certain requirements on developers undertaking this type of
development as “inefficient” and as impediments to getting the projects
built.108 Depending on what the requirements are, and assuming that
they do not cross into impermissible-exactions territory, the time to
engage in negotiating the construction deal is at the beginning of the
planning process. Cities should seek the best deals for their residents
and work to equitably disperse the benefits. If anything, cities often do
not ask for enough on behalf of their constituents.109 There is ample

108. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 440.
109. Too often city officials enter into imprudent contracts with vendors and
other corporate entities without fully accounting for the ramifications of
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evidence documenting the substantial gains developers realize in
association with the LIHTC projects.110 As long as developers can make
a sufficient level of profit to motivate them to construct affordable
housing, they will do so.
C. Mobility Grants and Their Relationship to Inclusive Communities

One of the strategies that Moving Toward Integration recommends
is the distribution of mobility grants in accordance with certain
criteria.111 There is much that I like about this proposal. It restores
agency to renters and homebuyers by empowering them to make
racially integrating housing decisions. The proposal seeks to avoid some
of the problematic bureaucratic, middle-person issues that arose in
Inclusive Communities regarding governmental administration of the
LIHTC and the resistance of white suburbs to having low-income
housing constructed in their areas. Mobility grants would subsidize
movers though a reduced interest rate or housing-allowance awards.112
My caution is that it would be necessary to monitor the distribution
of the mobility grants, as well as the results. It is necessary to ensure
that they, in fact, operate in both directions—allowing for blacks to
integrate white areas and whites to integrate black areas—not just in
the latter direction, subsidizing whites gentrifying areas populated by
blacks and, ultimately, displacing them by driving up costs. Where
individuals and agencies are involved, Inclusive Communities teaches
that there is always the possibility for disparities in program
implementation.113 Just as the Texas Department of Housing was
criticized for failing to administer the LIHTC in a way to foster racial
integration, there is a risk that the structures (i.e., courts, institutions,
agents, and decision-makers) responsible for the administration of the
mobility grants may not adhere to the purposes and objectives of plan.
I note that Moving Toward Integration is sensitive to this latter
possibility and recognizes the need to guard against it.114
the deal. The assets may be improperly valued given the market, the
length of the contract may be too long, etc.
110. Chris Edwards & Vanessa B. Calder, Low-Income Housing Tax Credit:
Costly, Complex, and Corruption-Prone, CATO Inst. Tax & Budget
Bull., Nov. 13, 2017, at 1, 3; Laura Sullivan, Affordable Housing Program
Costs More, Shelters Fewer, NPR (May 9, 2017), https://www.npr.org/
2017/05/09/527046451/affordable-housing-program-costs-more-sheltersless [https://perma.cc/8VWM-EWAH].
111. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 423–29.
112. Id. at 425.
113. I raise this point because the authors envision that a “metropolitan
council” would be charged with the details of program design. Id.
114. Id. at 423–24.
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Inclusive Communities, both at the Supreme Court and on remand,
illustrates how courts and government can thwart, rather than advance,
integration objectives. Local government can undermine and subvert
the good intentions of federal laws and statutes. Individual actions, with
the assistance of local government, can hinder (or decelerate) wellintended judicial decisions designed to advance racial integration.
Buchanan v. Warley,115 Shelley v. Kraemer,116 the Mount Laurel cases,117
and, in the realm of education, Brown v. Board of Education,118 are
illustrative of this problem. 119

IV. Banks: Promises and Problems
For good reasons, Moving Toward Integration devotes substantial
attention to banks. Like the book’s authors, I recognize that banks are
essential to addressing issues of racial integration and housing
inequality; banks have played an integral part in the financial wellbeing of individuals, neighborhoods, and cities. They are extraordinarily
powerful entities that create and preserve wealth. As lenders, they
facilitate access to housing. I also agree with the authors that the type
of banking institution can make a tremendous difference. The authors
make the important distinction between the megabank, on the order of
Wells Fargo or Bank of America, and exceptional community banks,
like the now-defunct South Shore Bank.120 Noting that distinction is
relevant to my comments on the authors’ fifth strategy of turning to
115. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
116. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
117. See, e.g., Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). For an enlightening discussion of the
Mount Laurel cases, see Paula A. Franzese et al., Mount Laurel and the
Fair Housing Act: Success or Failure?, 19 Fordham Urb. L.J. 59 (1991).
118. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
119. See Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of
Education and The Unfulfilled Hopes For Racial Reform (2005).
Another example is the lack of compliance with the federal “affirmatively
furthering fair housing” (“AFFH”) rule. Notwithstanding the legal
mandate to affirmatively further fair housing, federal agencies, including
HUD, have not always worked to integrate communities or alter
segregation patterns. See e.g., NFHA, et al. v. Carson, Civ. Action No.
1:18-cv-01076, filed May 8, 2018 (the National Fair Housing Alliance and
others filed suit against HUD alleging that HUD improperly suspended
“key requirements of the AFFH Rule”), para. 78.
120. See FDIC Failed Bank Information, FDIC https://www.fdic.gov/bank/
individual/failed/shorebank.html [https://perma.cc/3SNQ-YPXC] (last updated
Jan. 29, 2019) (“On Friday, August 20, 2010, ShoreBank, Chicago, IL was
closed by the Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was named Receiver.”).
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community development banks to help improve the financial profiles of
under-served banking populations and promote the asset growth
necessary for enhancing the likelihood of transitioning to raciallyintegrated neighborhoods. The authors propose that “the role of the
bank would not only be to improve the credit records and access to
credit for households in segregated communities, but also to assist in
supervising and guiding the neighborhood initiative.”121 I further agree
with the authors that a “key problem in inner-city communities
is . . . the absence of financial institutions engaged in community
building.”122 I differ from them, however, in their assessment of lending
practices in the African-American community. The authors suggest that
the problems experienced are not attributable to an absence of “fair
lending per se.”123 I disagree. Blacks have faced sustained
discriminatory, unscrupulous, and predatory-lending practices.124 There
is substantial scholarship and evidence to support that position.125 I
disagree with the authors regarding the extent of the damage that
lending institutions, historically, have caused African-American
communities, the continued harms that banks (including their agents)
perpetrate, and the potential for productive future transactional
relationships that will serve racial integration goals.126 Redlining and
reverse redlining practices have left indelible marks.127
121. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 434.
122. Id. at 230.
123. Id.
124. Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (2014); Jonathan Spader et al.,
Fostering Inclusion in American Neighborhoods (2017), available
at https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/a_shared_future_
fostering_inclusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC3J-HSSQ]; KeeangaYamahtta Taylor, Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real
Estate Industry Undermined Black Homeownership (2019);
Beryl Satter, Family Properties: Race, Real Estate and the
Exploitation of Black Urban America (2009).
125. Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law (2017).
126. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 251–68.
127. Redlining refers to a set of discriminatory loan practices. Redlining takes
its name from the maps drawn by the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
(HOLC), a federal agency no longer in existence. At its inception,
redlining entailed HOLC demarcating various regions of a city, identifying
those neighborhoods that were deemed creditworthy and those that were
deemed poor credit risks. The red refers to the coloring indicating the
designated poor or high risk sections on the maps. Based upon those
designations, lenders, appraisers, and other officials have made decisions
regarding mortgage loans and property valuation. Historically, redlining
has operated to deny African Americans equal access to mortgage loans
on fair terms. Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law 59–64 (2017).
Reverse redlining refers to the targeting of specific racial groups for
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In this section, I reference two examples to reflect on Moving
Toward Integration’s suggestions concerning banks.
A. The Racial Surtax: Department of Justice Settlement with Wells Fargo
Bank, NA

In 2012, Wells Fargo entered into a $175 million settlement
agreement with the Department of Justice (DOJ).128 The DOJ had
alleged that Wells Fargo committed numerous violations of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act.129 The suit alleged,
among other things, that mortgage brokers affiliated with Wells Fargo
“steered” minority borrowers into higher priced and riskier loans than
whites with similar credit profiles.130 According to the government’s
proposed consent decree, in 2009, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) “determined that it had reason to believe that Wells
Fargo engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of
race or color, in violation of the FHA and the EOCA”131:
“Specifically, the OCC found that, after controlling for credit
factors, there was reason to believe that Wells Fargo placed
African-American applicants in the subprime mortgage lending
channel in the Washington-Baltimore-Northern Virginia, DCMD-VA-WV Combined Statistical Area (“Washington CSA”)
more frequently than similarly-situated white applicants during
the period from 2004–2008.”132

The DOJ also conducted its own investigation into the bank’s practices,
in May 2009, and found similar disparities.133
predatory lending practices and risky loans, such as subprime mortgages
with extraordinarily high interest rates or other unfavorable terms.
128. Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y.
Times (July 12, 2012). https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/
wells-fargo-to-settle-mortgage-discrimination-charges.html [https://perma.cc/
S5MY-4LBX].
129. Id.
130. Id.; Rick Rothacker & David Ingram, Wells Fargo to Pay $175 Million in
Race Discrimination Probe, Reuters (July 12, 2012), https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-wells-lending-settlement/wells-fargo-to-pay-175million-in-race-discrimination-probe-idUSBRE86B0V220120712 [https://
perma.cc/DK84-9YT5].
131. Consent Order at 2, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Case 1:12cv-01150, (D.D.C. July 12, 2012), available at https://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/resources/14201271211384881962.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX5XA6CJ].
132. Id.
133. Id.
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The import of the government’s allegations, supporting evidence,
and resulting settlement agreement should not be overlooked. This
hefty settlement is a sign of the wide-ranging predatory-lending
practices that banks engaged in with respect to primarily black and
Latinos communities. It is also a troubling sign of the dedication of
some major lending institutions to flouting laws aimed at ensuring
fairness and equity in loan transactions in order to extract as much
capital as possible from targeted minority groups.134 An assistant
attorney general working on the case referred to the differential
treatment as a “racial surtax.”135 A lingering question remains when
incorporating banks into the plan for racial diversification of
neighborhoods: How can the racial surtax be avoided?
B. Bank of America Corp., et al. v. City of Miami (2017)

Turning now to Bank of America, Corp., et al. v. City of Miami.136
This case offers an example of how powerful structuring institutions,
like banks, can complicate the success of integration and fair-housing
initiatives. The case also highlights the permissive environment that
municipalities facilitated for banks. In this insufficiently regulated
space, banks were able to inflict substantial harm on certain
neighborhoods in the years leading up to the Great Recession.
At the Supreme Court, the Miami case involved standing.137
Specifically, the Court decided whether the City of Miami had standing
to bring an FHA case against Wells Fargo and Bank of America.138
Scrutinizing the “aggrieved-person” standard under the FHA, the Court

134. Perhaps, Sander, Kucheva, and Zasloff’s call for more detailed testing—
completing loan application data rather than merely paired testing,
combined with vigilant enforcement of the FHA and other important laws
like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), etc.—will allow for more
substantial strides to be achieved. See generally Sander et al., supra
note 1, at 423–66.
135. Savage, supra note 128.
136. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). The behavior towards minority borrowers that
Miami alleged was apparently not limited to that city, judging from the
cases that have been filed in Philadelphia, Oakland, and other cities; it
appears that banks engaged in these practices in numerous black and
Latino communities throughout the country. See e.g., City of Philadelphia
v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. CV 17-2203, 2018 WL 424451, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 16, 2018); Cook County. v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp.
3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
15-CV-04321-EMC, 2018 WL 3008538, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018).
137. Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
138. Id. Bank of America was involved by virtue of its acquisition of
Countrywide Financial.
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concluded that Miami had standing (under Article III)139 to bring its
civil claim for monetary damages.140 The Court also recognized that the
economic harms that Miami asserted were “arguably within the zone of
interests” targeted by the FHA.141 The Court remanded the case on the
causation element, holding that in order to prevail, a plaintiff needs to
do more than assert that its injuries were the “foreseeabl[e]” result of
the defendant’s alleged statutorily prohibited conduct.142 Instead, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that “the harm alleged has a sufficiently
close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.”143 The Court left
the task of delineating the proper proximate cause and application
standards to the lower courts.144
The underlying case concerned the City of Miami’s complaint that
the banks violated the FHA by “intentionally” engaging in predatory
banking practices aimed at African-American and Latino neighborhood
residents,145 such as charging higher interest rates on loans, levying
unreasonably high fees and penalties, and denying minority borrowers
opportunities to refinance or modify their loans.146 The city further
alleged that the banks’ practices: (i) led to higher rates of foreclosure
for minority borrowers when compared to nonminority borrowers; (ii)
the behavior disproportionately created pockets of “foreclosures and
vacancies,” which precipitated “stagnation and decline in AfricanAmerican and Latino neighborhoods”;147 and (iii) the conduct brought
about a decrease in property values in numerous neighborhoods
populated by these racial groups.148 But what is really interesting about
this case is that the city is the entity seeking to collect for the harm:
Miami argued that the harms suffered by black and Latino communities
were also detrimental to the city itself.149 Specifically, the city
139. In order to satisfy the Article III standing requirement, the plaintiff “must
show an ‘injury in fact’ that is ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s conduct
and ‘that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Id. at
1302 (quoting Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)).
140. Id. at 1303.
141. Id. (“lost tax revenue and extra municipal expenses—satisfy the ‘cause of
action’ (or ‘prudential standing’) requirement”).
142. Id. at 1301.
143. Id. at 1305.
144. Id. at 1305–06.
145. Id. at 1304.
146. Id. at 1301.
147. Id. at 1304 (quoting Joint Appendix, at 225, 409, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296
(Nos. 15-1111, 15-1112)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1302.
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maintained that the banks’ practices “adversely impacted the racial
composition of [Miami]”;150 sabotaged Miami’s goal to accomplish
“racial integration and desegregation”;151 interfered with Miami’s
objectives concerning “promoting fair housing and securing the benefits
of an integrated community”;152 diminished the city’s property tax
revenues;153 and caused Miami to allocate more money for “municipal
services . . . to remedy blight and unsafe and dangerous conditions.”154
This case is significant to my discussion in several respects. It
highlights the roles of two primary structuring entities—cities and
banks—in the housing-integration puzzle. It exposes the damage that
banks can cause when given essentially free reign (meaning
unregulated) to operate in neighborhoods. Although this a matter of
conjecture, I propose that the city was unguarded and expansive in
detailing the alleged harms in a way that it would not have been in
another context. Imagine, for example, a negotiation between the city
and African-American and Latino residents concerning the city’s failure
to utilize all of its protective tools and anti-discrimination mechanisms
to prevent the decimation of neighborhoods by deleterious lending
practices. In that context, the city may not have been so candid and
revealing of the harms caused.
It is also important to consider the impetus for cases of this type
and whether the driving factors need to be taken into account when
proposing solutions to deal with housing segregation. Many cities are
suffering from fiscal strangulation.155 Not having a deep revenue stream
to attend to infrastructure and provide public health and safety
resources is a significant problem. Clearly, many banks have deep
pockets. They are a logical target for municipalities seeking to
recuperate lost revenue and to replenish their fiscal reserves. Some
entity needs to pay; the banks have been enrichened by their actions,
so, local governments may logically reason, why not seek a share of
150. Id. at 1301 (quoting Joint Appendix at 232, 416, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296
(Nos. 15-1111, 15-1112)).
151. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 232, 416, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (Nos. 151111, 15-1112)).
152. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 232–33, 416–17, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296
(Nos. 15-1111, 15-1112)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1309 (quoting Joint Appendix at 417, Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (Nos.
15-1111, 15-1112)).
155. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 Yale L.J. 1118,
1140 (2014); The Fiscal Landscape of Large U.S. Cities: Local
Governments Still Recovering Long After Great Recession’s End, PEW
(Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
issue-briefs/2016/12/the-fiscal-landscape-of-large-us-cities [https://perma.cc/
V53A-A3NN].
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their profits? Moving Toward Integration undertakes a probing analysis
that prompts readers to scrutinize, intensely, whether cities have been
actively engaged in behaviors and policies to promote integration. In
their lawsuits, Miami and other cities asserted that their integration
actions were impeded by banks’ predatory actions. It is worth
examining these claims in more detail and acquiring information about
the particular integrative efforts taken. Cities should be prepared to
identify the specific initiatives underway that were aimed at achieving
integration.156 They should also be required to report on their progress.
The Miami case should also prompt cities to re-evaluate their
public–private relationships with banks and developers. When
municipalities provide inadequate protections and resources to
neighborhoods populated by historically marginalized racial minorities,
it leaves those communities susceptible to exploitative practices. Before
a crisis unfolds, municipalities should be more proactive about designing
policies aimed at racially integrating its communities and making them
economically sound. Alas, on remand, even though the Eleventh Circuit
held that Miami properly established a connection between the harms
claimed and the banks’ actions,157 Miami requested that the case be
dismissed.158 It is unclear whether Miami’s decision was prompted by
any concessions on the part of the banks.159 Regardless of the
motivations prompting the dismissal request, the litigation has
significance. Cases of this type illustrate that the municipality’s welfare
is interconnected with that of its residents. If cities, like Miami, are able
to leverage their power, it should be to set guidelines and goals
regarding business conduct within municipal borders. To the extent
that future lawsuits in this vein result in favorable settlements or
156. Miami’s claims raise a question of whether the heavily impacted
neighborhoods that they based the lawsuit on were integrated with black
and white residents or integrated with black and Latino residents, etc.
157. The Eleventh Circuit, on remand, constructed a proximate-cause standard
that litigants could conceivably satisfy. In addition to foreseeability, the
court observed: “Proximate cause asks whether there is a direct, logical,
and identifiable connection between the injury sustained and its alleged
cause. If there is no discontinuity to call into question whether the alleged
misconduct led to the injury, proximate cause will have been adequately
pled.” City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th
Cir. 2019), cert. granted, vacating as moot 140 S. Ct. 1259 (2020) (mem.).
In applying that standard, the Eleventh Circuit held that: “the City has
adequately pled proximate cause when it comes to a tax-base injury
because the Banks’ redlining and reverse-redlining practices bear some
direct relation to the City’s fiscal injuries.” Id. at 1294.
158. City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2019),
cert. granted, vacating as moot 140 S. Ct. 1259 (2020) (mem.).
159. Evan Weinberger, Miami Drops Fair Housing Cases Against Wells Fargo,
BofA (2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/miami-dropsfair-housing-cases-against-wells-fargo-bofa.
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favorable court decisions, cities should be required to allocate some of
the money to help those communities that were harmed in the first
place; they should not be able to simply pocket the gains.

V. Community Banks
I concur with Moving Toward Integration’s authors that because
banks are salient to solving the segregation–integration puzzle, they are
worthy of extensive study. Of course, they have been a substantial part
of the problem, but select banks like the extraordinary exception of
South Shore Bank, should be studied in detail to extract lessons. The
book’s chapters detailing the genesis of South Shore Bank and its
successes are fascinating and well worth extended examination. After
reading that material, I had two main interrelated questions. The
authors identify key successful ingredients in the establishment of South
Shore Bank, but I query whether a South Shore Bank can be replicated
in today’s times. I also question whether community banks can thrive
in this economic and political climate.

VI. The Will of the Public
It is not my intention to evaluate the soundness of the empirical
models that appear throughout Moving Toward Integration, but rather
to interrogate some of the assumptions the authors make. They
underestimate the resistance to integration exhibited by white
communities. Some of their claims about white flight are undercut by
the details. Drawing heavily upon the scholarship of Ingrid Gould Ellen
in reaching certain conclusions, the authors often resort to the phrase
“white avoidance” as opposed to “white flight.”160 White avoidance is,
arguably, a less polemical phrase than white flight, but it describes the
same phenomenon. That is, it refers to the phenomenon of whites
relocating to other areas (e.g., the suburbs) coinciding with the influx
of African Americans to the areas whites are relocating from (or
neighboring ones). Relying upon Ellen’s work, the authors state that
“whites move into racially integrated neighborhoods in large
numbers.”161 They further comment that while “[r]acial composition
certainly matters to whites assessing a neighborhood, and very few
whites move into predominantly black neighborhoods; . . . there is no
pervasive tendency for whites to avoid more modestly integrated
neighborhoods.”162 I have two questions in response. First, what was the
racial composition of the racially integrated neighborhoods that whites
160. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 116. (commenting that the “dominant
metaphor for the process of white-to-black neighborhood transition is
‘white flight’”).
161. Id. at 208.
162. Id. at 207.
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moved into that served as the basis for Ellen’s conclusion? Knowing the
racial composition of those neighborhoods is important to gauging the
latter’s comfort level with experiencing neighborhood cohabitation with
African Americans. Second, to what extent can the movement into
racially integrated neighborhoods be characterized as gentrification,
ultimately involving the displacement of blacks?
The authors further note that “there is no doubt that [the] short
distance moves from black districts into nearby, mostly middle-class
white neighborhoods occurred in the 1970s on a vast scale, amounting
in the aggregate to more than a million housing units shifting from
white to black occupancy.”163 The authors do not attribute this shift in
the complexion of the neighborhoods to white flight. Instead, they
explain that numerous other factors were at work, including “normal
turnover,” a higher level of black demand when compared to whites for
those properties, and the emphasis of whites on non-racial factors.164
Regarding the latter explanation, the authors conclude that while white
avoidance cannot be entirely dismissed from the analysis, “[Ingrid
Gould] Ellen shows persuasively that whites generally will not be much
interested in minority neighborhoods if they perceive crime, bad
schools, and housing deterioration to be concomitants of a large
minority presence.”165 Without more explanation, citing these non-racial
reasons as evidence that whites are not acting out of racial intolerance
or animus is problematic. If the whites in Gould’s study often made the
association between blacks and the negatives stated, then the
conclusion that they were not acting out of racial bias and fleeing based
upon that bias is questionable. What is true, however, is that no racial
group is interested in residing in areas with high crime, bad schools,
and dilapidated housing.

Conclusion
Moving Toward Integration asks the necessary complex, searching
questions to engage in difficult conversations regarding how African
Americans and whites live together—and apart—in the United States.
It compiles crucial data to provide some answers to those questions.
The arguments advanced, the historical background, and the empirical
data provide the implements for progress in the area of residential racial
integration. There is much I agree with in the book, but there are also
significant areas of disagreement.
I agree with the authors that the FHA, with the tool of disparateimpact liability, is a potentially powerful instrument that could achieve
substantial gains in the area of racially integrating housing. I note,
163. Id. at 221.
164. Id. at 227.
165. Id.
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however, that its potential has been dulled at times by various levels of
government actors as well as the courts. Changes need to be made in
the way in which disparate-impact theory is formulated to allow it to
do the work of rooting out discriminatory effects that are offered in
benign packages. In sum, the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted disparate-impact liability in a manner that makes it
unlikely that litigants will prevail; thus, without some other
interventions, the status quo of racial segregation will be preserved.
I share the authors’ assessment that the FHA has accomplished
significant progress in promoting integration by raising the racial
consciousness of decision-makers as they make decisions concerning
housing—who to rent to (landlords), where to rent or buy (realtors,
brokers), who to sell to (owners, neighbors). Raised consciousness
sometimes translates into less invidious racial discrimination in housing.
My analysis highlights: (i) the need to exert pressure on local entities
(municipalities, agencies, developers) to help diversify housing choices
and integrate neighborhoods; (ii) the need to rethink HUD’s burden
shifting framework for FHA disparate-impact claims and, perhaps,
discard it altogether; (iii) the need to assist plaintiffs, where FHA
litigation is necessary, with the first and third prongs of the burdenshifting framework to establish connections between the actions and
policies implemented by government and other entities and the damage
inflicted on communities, and to devise equally effective alternatives to
challenged practices; and (iv) the need to regulate banks and to refocus
their attention on the interests of communities rather than merely on
profit for shareholders. The task is to strike the right balance so that
the well-being of communities is foregrounded, while at the same time
allowing banks sufficient profitability to sustain themselves.
I view Moving Toward Integration as a reminder that there are
many who wish to have more integrated communities across the nation,
and that strategies are needed to make those desires a reality. The
authors are to be applauded not only for their articulation of
noteworthy integration techniques and initiatives, but also for
recognizing the value of integration and the benefits it brings to
America’s multiracial society.166

166. The Authors identify numerous positive outcomes, stating that, “racial
integration tends to improve educational and job opportunities for young
African-Americans, producing higher incomes and shrinking the black/white
income gap.” Id. at 243.
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